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ABSTRACT: The author presents the general circumstances that led to the
Austro-Turkish War (1737-1739), and analyzes the organization and activi-
ties of the Ragusan intelligence service, which was of essential value for the
security and well-being of the Republic. The Dubrovnik’s intelligence was
established and developed as an integral part of diplomatic service and proce-
dures, under the direct supervision of the Senate. Dubrovnik recruited its se-
cret agents from its own subjects employed in the foreign service, as well as
from the numerous merchants and seamen who acted as intelligence sources
in times of war and peace.
It is true that Dubrovnik, being located between East and West, maintained
a significant intelligence role over the centuries, notably in times of power
struggle and diplomatic and military conflict. Upheaval, political disbalance,
and particularly wars have always put its vulnerable stability to the test. The
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painful experience of the liberation campaign (1683-1699),1 together with the
fresh memory of the Republic’s feverish diplomatic efforts in Passarowitz
(1718),2 made the Ragusans fully aware of the impending danger when they
began hearing rumors that Austria was to side with Russia in the war against
Turkey.
Therefore, the Ragusan Senate had very important matters to discuss: 1.
What were the chances of Austria fighting the war or negotiating a peace? 2.
How would the political situation develop further? 3. What were the attitude
and territorial aspirations of Venice? It was a moment that required additional
effort on behalf of the intelligence apparatus, a time when Dubrovnik decided
to resort to its tested techniques of diplomacy: to be all ears, to lavishly dis-
play their smooth-talking talent, to step boldly into the arena, and to strive to
make the best of things.
On the basis of unpublished documents filed at the State Archive of
Dubrovnik the aim of this paper is to discuss the intelligence, counterintelli-
gence, and diplomatic activities that Dubrovnik developed during the Austro-
Turkish war.3
I
The Ragusan government was capable of gathering information on issues
of interest whenever necessary. Information was obtained through its consuls,
permanently appointed diplomatic officials (agents, chargés d’affaires), and
specially accredited diplomatic representatives (emissaries, envoys), as well
as through tradesmen and Ragusans living abroad.4
1 Sharing the exaltation of the Christian world over the Turkish defeat at Vienna, the Ragusans
broke off their diplomatic relations with the Ottomans and recognized an Austrian protectorate
over the Republic of Dubrovnik. Thus, their position with the Turks deteriorated, but as luck would
have it, a Turkish protectorate happened to be established over Dubrovnik soon after.
2 In the course of the Veneto-Austrian-Turkish War 1716-1718, the Venetians had taken con-
trol over the Ragusan hinterland (Popovo and Trebinje), the territory they reluctantly withdrew
from.
3 See particularly Mita KostiÊ, ≈Ustanak Srba i Arbanasa u Staroj Srbiji protiv Turaka 1737.-
1739. i seoba u Ugarsku.« Glasnik skopskog nauËnog druπtva 7-8 (1930): pp. 203-235; Adem
HandæiÊ, ≈Bosanski namjesnik Hekim Oglu Ali-paπa.« Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju i istoriju
jugoslavenskih naroda pod turskom vladavinom 5 (1955): p. 136.
4 See Bogdan Krizman, O dubrovaËkoj diplomaciji. Zagreb: Povijesno druπtvo NR Hrvatske, 1951.
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At this critical moment when information from Vienna was needed most,
they had no diplomat stationed there.5 Luckily though, a Ragusan, Dr. Petar
Bianchi, was known to have resided in Vienna since 1731.6 The Austrian capi-
tal offered hospitality to yet another man from Dubrovnik: the patrician Frano
–. Gondola.7 At the same time Monsignor Nikola –ivoviÊ, also a Ragusan,
was provost in Pécs, Hungary.8
Although it had no official diplomatic representatives in Vienna, the
Ragusan Senate still had a few reliable sources there. The decision whether
to make any contacts in the Austrian capital or not initiated a lively discus-
sion during the Senate session of 27 July 1736.9 The first motion to pass a
definite decision on this delicate matter was denied, while the second motion
was defeated by only one vote. They proceeded to vote on a proposal that
the Minor Council be ordered to write to Frano –. Gondola, provost –ivoviÊ,
and Dr. Petar Bianchi in Vienna. The motion passed with only three dissent-
ing votes.
Gathering from the circumstances, the Senate was more than anxious to
obtain information, for three letters were dispatched from the office the very
next day. They were accompanied by a letter addressed to Marko Antun
OrebiÊ, Ragusan consul to Rijeka, a port town of the north Adriatic which at
that time was under Habsburg rule. OrebiÊ10 was petitioned to forward the
letters to Vienna and to deliver the replies to Dubrovnik by special boat the
moment they arrived from the capital.11
5 Gabriel Hallberg was their agent until 1733. See Bogdan Krizman, Diplomati i konzuli u
starom Dubrovniku. Zagreb: PoduzeÊe za izdavanje, prodaju i distribuciju knjiga, 1957: pp. 186-187.
6 On Petar Bianchi see –uro Körbler, ≈DubrovËanin Petar Bjanki i neÊak mu Didak Arboscelli.«
Rad JAZU 196 (1913): pp. 1-52; Risto JeremiÊ and Jorjo TadiÊ, Prilozi za poznavanje zdravstvene
kulture starog Dubrovnika I. Beograd: Biblioteka Centralnog higijenskog zavoda, 1939: p. 75.
7 I have not been able to establish his position in Vienna nor the reason he was sent only one
letter, which remained unanswered.
8 In 1748 –ivoviÊ was appointed coadjutor to the bishop of Syrmia and installed as bishop of
Anamuria; in 1735 he became the bishop of Syrmia. In 1756 he was offered the seat of archbishop
in Dubrovnik, which, at the prompting of Maria Theresa, he refused. By donating 2,000 florins to
the Dubrovnik Cathedral, –ivoviÊ put up the altar of St. John of Nepomuk. Diplomata et acta
saec. XVIII (hereafter cited as: DA XVIII), ser. 76, vol. 934 and 939 (State Archives of Dubrovnik,
hereafter cited as: SAD).
9 Acta Consilii Rogatorum, ser. 3 (hereafter cited as: Cons. Rog.), vol. 157, f. 159 (SAD).
10 Posted consul to Rijeka on 17 May 1736. Cons. Rog., vol. 157, f. 115v.
11 Litterae et commissiones Ponentis, ser. 27.1 (hereafter cited as: Litt. Pon.), vol. 54, ff. 146v-
149 (SAD).
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Each of the said letters were of more or less the same contents: the Senate
wanted to have accurate information on whether the imperial army, already
maneuvering along the border between Hungary and Serbia, would take part
in certain operations against Turkey, and whether war between the two pow-
ers was really inevitable. “Therefore we require”—it said in the letter to
Bianchi—“detailed information on the [imperial army’s] intents and possi-
ble future steps, or at least the latest news on the matter for us to acknowl-
edge and abide by”. The Senate then expresses its hope that Bianchi, thanks
to his connections with people in high positions, will accomplish the mission
successfully.12 “Your connections with notables will most surely enable you
to gather the reliable information that the Senate, by whose order this letter
is being written to you, expects from your virtue and punctuality”. They also
tried to encourage Bianchi to perform his task to the best of his abilities, for
thus, his work would be particularly appreciated by the Senate. “We assure
you that your every effort in the matter will be acknowledged most accord-
ingly.”13 Finally, all three addressees were instructed to send their reports via
the Rijeka consul and back to Dubrovnik by special ship.
On 15 July 1736, following the established practice, Marko I. T. Bassegli
was instructed to pay an initial visit on behalf of the Republic to Ali-pasha
Hekim Oglu, the newly appointed pasha to Bosnia.14 The Ragusans already
had the pleasure of knowing the pasha from the time he held the office of
grand vizier. Anxiously waiting for the reply from Vienna on one hand, and
deeply troubled by rumors of military movements along the Hungarian-Ser-
bian border and the transfer of troops from Italy to Hungary on the other, the
government of Dubrovnik dispatched additional instructions to Bassegli on
25 August.
Bassegli was instructed to pay a secret visit to the pasha, inform him of
the menacing operations, and petition for protection against the Venetians,
who might take advantage of the situation and provoke skirmishes along the
border. Bassegli was specifically instructed to observe the pasha’s reactions,
as well as memorize as much of the interview as possible. “It is imperative
12 Litt. Pon., vol. 54, f. 147v.
13 Bianchi did not volunteer for the intelligence work, as stated by Körbler (≈DubrovËanin
Petar Bjanki«: p. 19), but was asked by the Senate in a letter of 28 July 1736; Litt. Pon., vol. 54,
f. 147v.
14 Litterae et commissiones Levantis, ser. 27.1, (hereafter cited as:  Litt. Lev.), vol. 74, f. 22v
(SAD).
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that you make every effort not only to remember the statements His Excel-
lency will deliver upon you during the meeting, especially with regard to the
Venetian issue, but that you also observe his reactions that your presentation
is likely to stir, so that you can inform us of everything in detail upon your
return.”15
Commissioned as tribute envoys in Constantinople on 11 September 1736,
Rafo I. Gozze and Jakov D. Bobali also acted as sources. In a letter of 13
November 1736, the Senate demanded that they continue informing about the
relations between Constantinople and Moscow and the conflict between
them.16 In case the Russians were to march into Walachia or Moldavia, they
were instructed to dispatch a special messenger to provide the government
and the merchants who did business there with the up-to-date information.
For confidential reasons, the military and political reports were to be ciphered
and sent by special delivery: “All news of war and pertaining to the political
conditions, you are to cipher and send by special mail.”17 The envoys took
their time at the Porte. In a letter of 7 May 1737 the Senate urged their reply,
as they had received nothing for quite some time. The letters might have gone
missing and they had no news whatsoever, “for we are here in absolute dark-
ness.”18
However, Dubrovnik’s prime source in Constantinople was its consul, Luka
Chirico.19 The Senate wrote two letters, one to the envoys and the other to
Chirico, prompting him to keep them posted and to code the messages when
the circumstances required.20 On 30 May 1738, they insisted on yet greater
secrecy, instructing him to address the coded letter to a fictive person by the
name of Cileno Calerini. “We draw your closest attention to the fact,” the
letter read, “that you dispatch your letters not only via Kotor, but via Bosnia
as well, should a confidential and trustworthy person travel that way. You
are to cipher these messages and address them to the name you are already
15 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, f. 29v.
16 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, f. 39.
17 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, f. 53.
18 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, f. 63v.
19 Consul to Constantinople from 1709 to 1744. Credited for the protection of Republic’s in-
terests at the Congress of Passarowitz in 1718, were he acted as the Turkish language interpreter
to the British delegation.
20 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, f. 64.
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familiar with—Cileno Calerini—as to conceal both the sender and the ad-
dressee with due respect in the present circumstances. Furthermore, you are
to put the letters in an envelope addressed to a certain person in Dubrovnik
you have regular correspondence with, to keep it strictly confidential.”21 At
the time, the Ragusans also had their dragoman (interpreter) at the Porte,
Andrija Magrijin. This man soon became the leading figure of a scandal.
Without the Senate’s permission, he was engaged by Dutch ambassador
Cornelis Calcoen to act as his personal interpreter at the Nemirov Congress.22
For gathering information from the West, the Senate established a number
of intelligence outposts throughout Italy.
The Ragusan agent Trajan LaliÊ23 was posted in Venice. His mission was
of particular importance, as he was in position to obtain significant informa-
tion concerning both Venice and Vienna.24 He managed to decipher the mes-
sages sent by the Venetian ambassador to Vienna25 and bailo in Constanti-
nople.26 He had his connections in Belgrade too,27 and had ways of breaking
into the confidential agenda of the Venetian Senate. In a coded letter of 6
October 1737, he informs about a report that the general of Dalmatia submit-
ted before the Venetian Senate in which the Ragusans were blamed for sup-
porting and encouraging the people of Popovo in Dubrovnik’s hinterland, in
their intent to fight for the emperor.28
In Rome, Abbot Frano Parensi operated as an agent of the Republic of
Dubrovnik.29 His close relations with the highest Church dignitaries, and
21 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, f. 84. On the cipher of the Republic of Dubrovnik see B. Krizman,
Diplomati i konzuli: pp. 109-123.
22 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, ff. 93, 131.
23 A plate commemorating this noteworthy Ragusan was posted on the wall of the Rector’s
Palace during his lifetime because in 1764 he saved Dubrovnik from starvation by obtaining the
permit from Venice to export grain to the Republic of Dubrovnik. He died in Venice in 1774. For
further details on him, see L’Epidauritano, lunario raguseo. Ragusa, 1912: p. 62. His correspond-
ence is filed in DA XVIII, vol. 3133.
24  DA XVIII, vol. 3133, no. 4, 7, 8, 13, 16, 17, 18.
25 DA XVIII, vol. 3133, no. 7, 8.
26 DA XVIII, vol. 3133, no. 8, 11.
27 DA XVIII, vol. 3133, no. 14, 18.
28 DA XVIII, vol. 3133, no. 25.
29 Appointed to agent in 1713. B. Krizman, Diplomati i konzuli: pp. 183-205.
53Z. ©undrica, The Intelligence Activities of the Dubrovnik Republic...
through them with the political elite as well, placed him in a position to dis-
patch reports of the highest reliability. His regular reports were either printed
or written. In September 1736 he even sent a topographical map of the cur-
rent military operations.30
Both LaliÊ’s mail from Venice and Parensi’s from Rome was delivered
via Ancona. LaliÊ was instructed to dispatch the original letter directly, and
its copy via Ancona. The Ragusan Senate followed the same procedure when
sending mail to Venice.
The Ragusan consul to Ancona was Domenico Storani.31 Apart from send-
ing mail and fostering the commercial affairs, dispatching reports was also
one of his regular duties.
Naples was another important center in Italy, Giusto Vandenheuvel (Joost
van den Heuvel) being appointed Ragusan agent to the Kingdom of Naples.32
His correspondence traveled via Barletta and Ragusan consul Filippo Bonelli,
who, like the above-mentioned Storani, sent regular reports. Vandenheuvel
would send leaflets printed in Naples or Foligno, but also hand-written dis-
patches. For instance, on 6 September 1739 he sent a report, printed in Mantua,
on the battle that had taken place at Grocka on 22 July 1739 between the
Ottoman Turks and the Austrians.33
All the letters dated from this period, sent from Dubrovnik to either Ven-
ice, Ancona, Rome, Naples, or Barletta, were habitually rounded off with
expressions of gratitude for the received reports and hearty requests for more
information on “world current events” (delle cose correnti del mondo).
The Ragusans developed an impressive network of intelligence agents in
Bosnia. The reports were sent as confidential correspondence and were dou-
ble-checked through oral statements of persons arriving from Bosnia.34 The
Republic of Dubrovnik had its men posted all over Bosnia, assigned to gather
information from all sources and keep the Senate posted. Those are the peo-
ple that Bianchi in his letters refers to as “credible persons” (persone di
credito), “merchants we are familiar with” (mercanti a noi ben cogniti),35 “our
30 Litt. Pon., vol. 56, f. 4.
31 His correspondence (1710-1747) is filed in DA XVIII, vol. 3110.
32 Dubrovnik’s agent from 1734 to 1762. The correspondence is filed in DA XVIII, vol. 3093.
33 DA XVIII, vol. 3093, no. 179.
34 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 29.
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correspondents” (nostri corrispondenti),36 “our agents” (nostri accommessi),37
“men of confidence” (confidenti),38 “persons specially assigned to see closer
into the matter” (espressi per riconoscer meglio le cose),39 “confident men
assigned for urgent inspection” (confidenti incaricati per la sollecita
inspetione),40 and “our men specially assigned for gathering information”
(nostra gente in ciò espressamente impiegata).41
The organization of the Ragusan intelligence network in Bosnia was best
described in a letter of the Ragusan government sent to Bianchi in Vienna on
30 July 1737. In one of his reports Bianchi informed the government of the
contradiction between the information provided to them and that in the pos-
session of the Court. The reply letter read, “In reference to the matter [con-
tradictory reports], we state that we received the information that we then
provided you with from confidential persons who had been in Bosnia them-
selves, its reliability being confirmed by the merchants we are familiar with
and who have returned from Bosnia. In addition, not only did we occasion-
ally assign persons to see into the matter, but we also maintained elaborate
correspondence with reliable persons on the spot. Therefore, it is beyond our
understanding how such a contradiction might have occurred, unless reports
of different dates were in question and their news were the latest.”42
The agents permanently stationed in Bosnia were joined at times by spe-
cial messengers assigned to observe the reliability of the information collected,
with whom the Senate kept regular correspondence.43 Moreover, they kept
correspondence with the pasha’s ministers.44 If the circumstances required
it, the Senate expanded the intelligence network. On 11 September 1737, they
delivered to Vienna the information acquired from the “new correspondent
35 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 32.
36 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 38.
37 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 61v.
38 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 74.
39 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, ff. 35v and 39.
40 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 66v.
41 Litt. Pon., vol. 56, f. 143.
42 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 35v.
43 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 35.
44 Litt. Pon., vol. 56, f. 11v.
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in Albania”.45 The list of all the places in which the agents were stationed is
difficult to establish. There exist reports from Bijelo Polje,46 Novi Pazar,47
even the Ottoman camp in Vitovlje.48
Thus those were the “good channels” (buoni canali), as referred to in the
report sent to Vienna on 20 February 1738, through which the Ragusan in-
telligence service gathered necessary information. Unfortunately, no reports
dating from this period and sent by the Bosnian agents have been preserved.
Their content can only be partially reconstructed on the basis of the reports
dispatched from Dubrovnik to Vienna.
More than one occasion of Ragusan agents acquiring foreign confidential
mail have been recorded. For instance, the Ragusans intercepted the letter of
a certain official of the Porte addressed to an agha, his subordinate,49 and that
of a merchant of Sarajevo to his merchant friend.50 They also seized the let-
ter a Jew from the Court of the Bosnian pasha had written to a Jew in Italy.51
Marco Cobasso was Ragusa’s vice consul to Durrës, Albania. On 13 No-
vember 1736 he was particularly instructed to provide the Senate with an
“abundance of information” from Albania, but also from the Porte and else-
where.52 He was to dispatch the reports by every ship available.53
Whichever the means, the delivery of reports often was a problem in it-
self. At sea, mail was carried by merchant ships which happened to stop at
one port or another or, in case of emergency, by special boats. The length of
the voyage depended greatly on the weather conditions. Stormy weather fre-
quently caused a delay of several days. For instance, one ship carrying mail
for Barletta was unable to set sail from Dubrovnik from 12 February to 4
March 1736.54 The journey from Barletta to Dubrovnik could have been made
45 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 73.
46 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 39v.
47 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 33rv.
48 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 210.
49 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 211v.
50 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 222.
51 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 23.
52 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, f. 54.
53 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, f. 66v.
54 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, f. 125.
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in less than 24 hours, but it usually lasted 2-3 days.55 A letter from Ancona
could reach Dubrovnik in three days. The mail from Rome usually arrived in
Dubrovnik in 15 days,56 but it could have taken as long as several months.57
Venice-Dubrovnik was a 15-day journey as well,58 while Rijeka-Dubrovnik
took half the time.59 Trpanj, on the Peljeπac Peninsula, was the main stopo-
ver on the route from Rijeka to Dubrovnik and back. A number of boats were
harbored there, awaiting mail from Dubrovnik to be dispatched to Rijeka,
where they would receive mail to be shipped back. These fishing boats
(gajetas) were equipped with oars and sails and carried five-man crews: a
captain and four sailors. Mail from Dubrovnik was shipped to Ston, carried
by a messenger to the village of Trpanj, and then proceeded to Rijeka by boat.
There was no possible means of sending mail to Vienna and receiving a re-
ply in less than a fortnight.60 According to the records, one letter from Rijeka
to Vienna traveled from 21 July to 2 August 1738.61 On the average, the let-
ters journeyed 18 to 20 days, with the fastest record being 13 days.62
Gathering information from Bosnia was hampered by the rebellion of the
Albanian tribes who marched into Novi Pazar in 1737. During the second
Turkish attempt to take possession of the city, several persons were killed,
including a Ragusan merchant, while the whereabouts of Frano BogaπinoviÊ,
also a trader, remained a mystery for quite some time.63 This incident aroused
increasing suspicion and extra caution among the Turks.64 They trusted no
one. They closed all the passages and intercepted all mail without exception.65
55 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, f. 125.
56 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, f. 236.
57 The copy of the letter Abbot Parensi sent from Rome on 23 August 1738 via Venice ar-
rived in Dubrovnik in the last days of January 1739. Litt. Pon., vol. 56, f. 44.
58 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, ff. 155 and 164v.
59 OrebiÊ’s letters illustrate the great difference in the duration of journeys: seven to thirty
days. DA XVIII, vol. 3120, no. 54, 58.
60 DA XVIII, vol. 3120, no. 48.
61 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 229.
62 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 40v.
63 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, ff. 48v-49. BogaπinoviÊ managed to escape. He reached Dubrovnik, but
was warned not to enter the city to avoid the Turkish petition for his extradition. Litt. Pon., vol.
55, f. 99v.
64 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 48v.
65 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, ff. 49v and 59.
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Intelligence work became extremely dangerous.66 On account of one letter
the Turks took hold of, two Ragusan missionaries in Plovdiv, RadomiriÊ and
BoπkoviÊ, were killed in May of 1738.67 According to the letter of 18 Au-
gust 1738 addressed to Bianchi, July or early August of the same year also
marked the disappearance of the “ablest Ragusan agent,” who was always of
assistance to the Republic.68
The incident in Novi Pazar scared away the Ragusan tradesmen, who once
had been scattered across the Ottoman lands, and significantly reduced the
influx of information from these parts. Most of them fled, for no one wanted
to do business in a place controlled by the Turkish police.69
The problems in delivering the reports were diverse: messengers’ acci-
dents,70 loss of mail,71 or Turkish extra precautionary measures.72 All per-
sons suspected of carrying information contrary to Turkish interests were
denied passage.73
The reports from Constantinople arrived via three routes: the main Con-
stantinople—Sofia—Niπ caravan route, then through Herzegovina via BileÊa
and Trebinje to Dubrovnik; from Constantinople, through the Vardar valley,
to the mouth of the Drim, and then via Kotor to Dubrovnik; or by sea.74 Al-
though under ideal conditions the journey could be made in less than 20 days,
the correspondence rarely traveled that fast.75 The reports from Constantino-
ple, later to be dispatched from Dubrovnik to Vienna, were occasionally
66 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 216v.
67 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 194v.
68 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 230.
69 Litt. Pon., vol. 56, f. 11v.
70 Litt. Pon., vol. 56, f. 130.
71 Litt. Pon., vol. 56, f. 134.
72 Litt. Pon., vol. 56, f. 130.
73 Litt. Pon., vol. 56, f. 142v.
74 In a letter to Bianchi dated 18 September 1738, the Senate confirms receiving the letter
from Constantinople of 22 July. They did not receive the one dated 14 July and sent by regular
mail, whereas the letter of 12 August reached Dubrovnik via Kotor. Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 248.
75 See Bariπa KrekiÊ, ≈Kurirski saobraÊaj Dubrovnika sa Carigradom i Solunom u prvoj
polovini XIV. veka.« Zbornik radova Vizantoloπkog instituta SAN 1 (1952): p. 118.
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thirty,76 forty-five,77 or even fifty days old.78
II
Thanks to its well-organized intelligence service, the Ragusan government
was fully acquainted with European events, on both the political and the mili-
tary level, making every effort not to be taken by surprise. In this way, the
Ragusans were preparing themselves, if and when the time came, for a pos-
sible change in rulership over the neighboring countries. Their major con-
cern was Venice and the possibility of its creeping up on them from behind
and thus cutting off their hinterland trade routes.
The episode of the Austro-Turkish War could be taken as a characteristic
example of the political and diplomatic skill of the Dubrovnik Republic. For
centuries, the needs of commerce and maintenance of independence had im-
pelled the Ragusans to create suitable instruments for dealing with great pow-
ers. In view of the above war and the activities Dubrovnik undertook, I can-
not but remember an old saying commonly used to describe a Ragusan in the
east Mediterranean: “We are not Christians, we are not Jews, but poor
Ragusans” (Non siamo christiani, non siamo ebrei, ma poveri Ragusei).79
In a letter of 28 July 1736 addressed to Bianchi, the Senate required in-
formation about the possible hostilities between Austria and Turkey.80 In his
reply of 18 August 1736, Bianchi wrote that if the Ottomans agreed to the
Russian and Austrian conditions, there would be no threat of war, at least
not until the end of the year, because the frontier fortifications had not yet
been provisioned.81
The Senate contacted Bianchi again, demanding accurate information about
possible launch operations, and whether they would be directed toward
76 Litt. Pon., vol. 56, f. 108v.
77 Litt. Pon., vol. 56, f. 61v.
78 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 105.
79 Joseph von Hammer, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches, vol. VII. Pest, 1831: p. 29.
80 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2. This bundle contains Bianchi’s letters.
81 According to the Austrian terms, Turkey was to cede Walachia, Moldavia, and Bosnia, as
well as break off trade relations with the imperial lands.
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Walachia and Moldavia, or closer regions like Bosnia and Herzegovina.82 This
question was stimulated by their Italian source, who had informed them that
Bosnia was to become part of the Habsburg Empire, either on a preliminary
or a military basis.
Bianchi’s letter of 20 October furnished them with the answers. Meanwhile,
they received two more letters (dated 15 and 19 September), in which Bianchi
reported that the capital talked of nothing but war, and that opinions on the
subject varied. He exchanged views with two high-ranking generals who were
against the war. However, the Russian empress urged the Austrian troops to
march into Walachia and Moldavia, threatening to occupy the country her-
self and end her relations with Austria—if not openly, then by proclaiming
to be under no obligation by former agreements. In Bianchi’s opinion, the
war would certainly break out the following spring, unless the winter brought
a peace agreement negotiated by the Austrian emperor and two great sea
powers, the Netherlands and England. He further informed them of General
Schmettau’s project concerning the formation of a corps, under the command
of Prince Hilburghausen and the general himself, that was to strike Bosnia.
Bianchi expressed his willingness to say a good word for the Senate to the
two military officials, for he was well acquainted with both.
Bianchi’s second letter contained alarming news. The decision to launch
the campaign was made. The troops were to advance to Belgrade, attack Niπ
and Vidin, with one corps marching toward BuhaÊ. Bianchi expressed his fear
that the Austrian Army, due to the incompetence and inexperience of its two
leading warmongers, Prince Hilburghausen and Baron Bartenstein, could suf-
fer a major defeat.
This disturbing information must have reached Dubrovnik on 24 October.
The Senate was facing a difficult decision.83 They could send Bianchi’s let-
ter to Ali-pasha, contact Hilburghausen and Schmettau, as proposed by
Bianchi, or both? In its session held the following day,84 the Senate opted
for the second possibility, slightly modified, and decided unanimously to write
82 The letter of 23 September 1736. Litt. Pon., vol. 54, f. 168v.
83 This illustrates one of the weaknesses of the intelligence of the time. The Senate was igno-
rant of the latest events due to the slow communication (the letter containing the breaking news
was already on the road for 15 days). Bianchi dispatched it on 10 October, informing them of the
withdrawal of the war decision.
84 Cons. Rog., vol. 157, f. 165v.
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to Bianchi.85 Bianchi was to make the best of his relations with the said gen-
erals and express, on his own behalf, the satisfaction his Republic would ex-
perience on learning about the emperor’s decisions on Bosnia: that such a
grand operation had been entrusted to none other but them. Furthermore, he
was to mention the Republic’s fortunate position for having such a powerful
ruler, a fellow-Catholic, for its neighbor, who had always looked upon
Dubrovnik with special affection, offering protection whenever necessary.
Bianchi was further instructed to investigate the following strategic issues:
would the entire territory taken from the Ottomans remain under the Habsburg
rule, or portions of it be entrusted to Venice? If so, which part, in what way,
and under what conditions? “We consider this a matter of the gravest impor-
tance,” the letter read, “and thus, to the best of your ability, try to obtain this
information from the said generals, as it could be available to them from their
instructions.” Due to the gravity of the situation, Bianchi was instructed to
send coded weekly reports.
In the meantime, the Senate received two letters from Bianchi. In the first,
he informed them that the war had been called off. In the second, instead of
reporting as instructed in the Senate’s letter of 23 September, he gave a de-
tailed description of the course of the conference in which the decision about
waging was reached and the reasons for calling it off.86
When it was clear that the Porte had refused to come to terms with the
emperor,87 on 7 September 1736 a debate was initiated in the conference. Dur-
ing the meeting, the emperor ignored the opinions of the most experienced
generals, who voted against war, and other military and government officials.
Instead, at the prompting of the conference secretary Bartenstein and his crea-
ture Prinz Hilburghausen, he decided to declare war against the Turks with-
out further delay.88
As the armistice following the Treaty of Passarowitz was not yet over, the
85 Litt. Pon., vol. 54, f. 173v.
86 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 5 and 6.
87 The Ottomans were determined to resolve their conflict with Russia without the interfer-
ence of Austria; their peaceful withdrawal from Bosnia was out of the question; and lastly, em-
bargo in peacetime was contrary to natural rights.
88 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 6.
61Z. ©undrica, The Intelligence Activities of the Dubrovnik Republic...
emperor’s conscience was soothed by his personal confessor, Father Teneman.
Teneman heard from Zinzendorf that the emperor was fully informed about
the Ottomans’ intention to conclude peace and sign a pact with the Persians,
to whom the Turks were prepared to cede all the soil once owned by Persia
under the reign of Shah Abbas I (Armenia and Babylonia) if the Persians
helped them recover the territories lost in the previous wars in Hungary and
Albania.
Following the orders to launch an offensive, large military forces were
being concentrated in Futak, as well as Hilburghausen’s regiments around
Osijek. Marshal Palfi was first ordered to advance to Zemun, build bridges
across the Danube, and march toward Vidin, keeping the Turks busy while
“our hero Hilburghausen,” as Bianchi styled it, could invade Bosnia. In
Bianchi’s words, the wise men expected nothing but a disaster.
Luckily though, new letters from Constantinople arrived almost at the same
time as the report on the army Palfi had sent to the emperor through Duke
Tirain. The letters were concerned with the ensuing peace agreement between
Turkey and Persia, and Russia’s consent on the matter, the latter having set-
tled with Azov only. The report on the state of the army was shocking: it
was worn out from exhausting marches and disease; the Danube had flooded
and destroyed its hay; and morale was low. As the emperor intended to launch
operations against the Turks there and then, Marshal Palfi demanded an im-
mediate transfer for he had no intention of losing his reputation after fifty
years of loyal service. In addition, he implored the emperor not to put his
troops into the inexperienced hands of Hilburghausen, whose projects were
nothing but deceitful. Duke Tirain himself informed the emperor to have the
duumvir taken to hospital and treated with hellebore. These arguments helped
convince the emperor to withdraw his decision on war.
This decision brought some peace onto the European political scene.
Bianchi sent no further reports to Dubrovnik until 15 January 1737, meaning
that the Ragusan government practically received no news from him between
the end of November 1736 and the beginning of March 1737 when two of
his letters arrived, dated 15 January and 6 February.89
Dubrovnik was experiencing days pregnant with great suspense. Alarmed
by the rumors and anxious to have the most reliable information on all the
89 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 8 and 9.
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current issues, the Senate composed two letters, dated 11 January and 4 Feb-
ruary 1737.90 In the latter, they asked to be informed, according to the Sen-
ate resolution of 30 January 1737,91 of the exact procedure and the possible
intermediaries for obtaining an audition during which they could submit their
demands if need be. This evidence speaks in favor of the prevailing opinion
in the political circles of Dubrovnik and Europe alike that the Ottoman Em-
pire was dissolving.
The contents of the two impatiently awaited replies from Bianchi revealed
most interesting facts: the president of the War Council requested the grand
vizier to come to terms with the tsarina of Russia, or else Austria would en-
ter the war; military preparations were on the way despite92 the generals’ es-
timate according to which it was hard to believe that Turkey would fight
against two very powerful armies—those of Russia and Austria; in case of
war, the Venetians would have to make a payment or carry out diversions at
the expense of the emperor. Moreover, Bianchi asked the Senate, if it be in
their interest, to provide him with a bit of accurate information about the Turks
that he could use to trade with the emperor, a doing the Senate could soon
profit from.
The Senate was finally furnished with some concrete information accord-
ing to which they could act, and thanks to which they decided to side with
Austria. The situation was discussed twice in the Senate. In its session of 1
March, it was concluded that Bianchi should be informed of the agenda in
writing and not, as some members suggested, through a special envoy.93 The
Senate also authorized Bianchi to negotiate on behalf of the Republic at the
Court.94 During the later session, held on 6 March, it was decided to send
two copies of the letter. The dispatches left the Republic’s chancellery that
very day, to be carried to Rijeka by special ship delivery (cum cymba de
Zaptat).95 Two most carefully wrought letters, each the result of lengthy dis-
90 Litt. Pon., vol. 54, ff. 192rv and 206-207.
91 Cons. Rog., vol. 157, f. 200v.
92 Marshal Palfi bet 10,000 Hungarian golden coins that there would be no war, while an-
other military official bet 20,000 that Palfi was wrong. Bianchi himself believed in the possibility
of war. DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 9.
93 Cons. Rog., vol. 157, f. 217v. Fourteen senators voted for the assignment of a special rep-
resentative to Vienna, whereas 21 voted against.
94 Cons. Rog., vol. 157, f. 217v.
95 Cons. Rog., vol. 157, f. 218.
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cussion, were thus heading for Vienna. Both were addressed to Bianchi, al-
though only one was actually intended for him. The other, containing the news
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, was intended for the minister who, in Bianchi’s
opinion, would be most appropriate. The carefully chosen minister was to get
the impression that it was the Senate’s first letter to Bianchi. This explains
the duplicate scheme. Had, perhaps, the letters got into Turkish hands, the
Senate would have been victim of incomparable rage. The letter read as fol-
lows:
It has been the long-standing and ever-present disposition of
this Republic towitness the glorious armies drive the barbarians
away from these here borders and free us from the chains to which
we are geographically doomed. We now thank the Almighty, for
it seems the hour for our wishes to come true has arrived, and
we trust that we shall not only leave behind the troubles you are
so well acquainted with, but also feel the grace of Your Royal
and Catholic Highness, as we once did of Your father Leopold,
who assured us that the borders of his and our land were certain
to meet.96
They continued with how uneasy they were over Venice’s claims to the
neighboring territory, a position most disagreeable for His Highness and dis-
astrous for the Republic. They deeply hoped that the emperor would let no
other power interfere between the imperial and the Ragusan territory, refer-
ring to the agreement of 20 August 1684, and the resolutions of the Treaty of
Passarowitz (1718).
The Ragusan government was fully aware of the gravity of the situation.
Therefore, Bianchi was particularly instructed to take the greatest precautions
in step one, for the slightest mistake could jeopardize the entire plan with ir-
reparable consequences.97 The minister whom Bianchi was to choose had to
be of utmost confidence. The operation was to remain top secret, and Bianchi
was instructed to deny the minister’s possible proposition that the Ragusans
send their envoy ad hoc. Bianchi was further instructed to encode his reply
containing the name of the minister involved. Accepting Bianchi’s proposi-
tion to provide him with information about the Turks, the Senate also sent
96 Litt. Pon., vol. 54, f. 214.
97 Litt. Pon., vol. 54, f. 213.
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news on the most recent military preparations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
On 7 March 1737 the Senate replied to the letter of Provost –ivoviÊ, dated
9 February, in which he informed about the imperial army being on the alert,
citing the exact words from the emperor’s proclamation according to which
extra expenditures were needed for “the war against Turkey, which, no mat-
ter how hard we try to avoid, we shall have to fight.” In case the war opera-
tions took place, –ivoviÊ was instructed to keep the Senate posted weekly.98
On that same day, the Senate also produced some supplements to the let-
ter to Bianchi. They required information about the peace negotiators, the
English and the Dutch, along with the general attitude of France and Spain.
As mentioned earlier, the letters were dispatched by special boat to Rijeka.
OrebiÊ, the Ragusan consul to Rijeka, was instructed to urge Bianchi to speed
up the whole operation, and to delay the boat’s return until the reply from
Vienna.99
The reply reached Dubrovnik around 20 April,100 but the results concern-
ing the given assignment a month later.101 Namely, Bianchi could not organ-
ize an urgent audience with Bartenstein, a most influential figure, whom he
had chosen for consultation.102 Thanks to Baron Saidowitz, a mutual friend
of Bianchi and Bartenstein, the latter subsequently received Bianchi.
The report containing the results of the audience was composed in Vienna
on 13 April.103 Bianchi felt more than satisfied. Bartenstein proved coopera-
tive and willing to discuss it with the emperor. On the other hand, Bartenstein
suggested that Bianchi persuade the Senate to send highly confidential infor-
mation on the Turks as often as possible and thus contribute to the Repub-
lic’s position with the emperor. Bianchi followed his advice, estimating it a
very efficient means of approaching Bartenstein.
As for the Venetians, Bianchi wrote: “Most convincingly I assure Your
98 DA XVIII, vol. 3061, no. 37.
99 Litt. Pon., vol. 54, f. 220.
100 Litt. Pon., vol. 54, f. 234v.
101 Litt. Pon., vol. 54, f. 246.
102 An audience with Bartenstein was hard to get. Imperial ministers were also among those
queuing up for audience. DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no.13.
103 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 17.
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Excellencies that the Venetians will not do anything I myself had not had the
knowledge of earlier and in detail, nor will anything you dread take place
before I accomplish the plan.“104
He further reported on the arrival of the messenger with the grand vizier’s
answer to Königseg, president of the War Council. The grand vizier has been
asked whether he opted for war or peace. Peace was his answer in intent to
please the Russians. A congress was to be held in Soroki near the Prut River,
but in Vienna this move was understood as a means of buying time. As a
result, measures were taken for the army to withdraw from the winter camps
and group in Uipalanka, with the strategy of attacking Vidin, and later Bosnia
and Albania.
Bianchi’s letter of 27 April105 contained even more information on the war
operations and the structure of Hilburghausen’s troops, which were ready to
launch the attack against Bosnia. In the company of General Palavicini,
Bianchi intended to pay a visit to Hilburghausen. He further informed the
Senate of Palavicini’s scheme to make an official demand, through the em-
peror, for the Republic to man four frigates built on the Danube, as the
Ragusans were reputed to be worthy mariners. Bianchi managed to talk
Palavicini out of this scheme, which could expose the Republic.106
The information available to the Ragusans spoke in favor of the hostili-
ties, their anxiety being further increased by the letter of 1 May.107 Still, the
Ragusans were well aware of their favorable position in Vienna. According
to Bianchi, Bartenstein, impressed by the Republic’s attitude, had talked with
the emperor about Venetia’s pretensions, assuring the Ragusans of their safety
with Austrians at its borders. Bartenstein, whose wish was the emperor’s
command, as quoted by Bianchi, persuaded the Republic that no foreign mili-
tary force would be allowed to approach the Ragusan borders, following the
104 It is true that Bianchi established very good connections. He made the acquaintance of
Marshal Guido von Starenberg, General Palavicini, and Hilburghausen. Baron Saidowitz was a
friend of his. He paid frequent visits to Baron Bartenstein and Weber, the military executive. Duke
Hamilton, cavalry general, was his close friend and patron, the hospitality of whose home Bianchi
enjoyed. He also had connections with Baron Engelhart, commander of Orsova, Marshal
Kewenhüller, General Maulli, Russian envoy to Vienna, etc.
105 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 17.
106 These frigates an other vessels on the Danube were crewed by men from Hamburg, Senj,
Bakar, Rijeka, Trieste, Livorno, and Genoa. DA XVIII, vol. 3120/13, letter no. 34.
107 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 18.
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imperial victory, the Republic would enjoy the fruits of its sincere intentions
and devotion to the imperial cause. Thus Bartenstein asked the Republic to
keep him posted about everything taking place in the Ottoman lands, Bosnia
in particular. He also stated that he had been ordered by His Imperial High-
ness to inform Seckendorf and Hilburghausen of the decision, inviting Bianchi
to visit him in Luxemburg as soon as he got hold of some new information.
Bianchi’s letter was imbued with optimism. His lines had a soothing ef-
fect upon the Ragusans. According to him, the situation was under control as
long as it remained secret and information was exchanged regularly. “I can-
not explain why, he wrote, I happen to be warmly welcomed by the gentle-
men in the government... Chief councilors of the Chamber are my confidants.”
The most striking piece of information in the letter read, “Bosnia will most
surely come under Austrian rule, either by force or agreement. The Republic
is certain to border with the imperial state.”108 These were the emperor’s ex-
act words as quoted to Bianchi by Bartenstein. Bianchi considered the whole
matter settled. Well-established in Vienna, it was not surprising that the fol-
lowing idea crossed his mind: it would be very wise for the Republic to pur-
chase some of the land the emperor was about to take control over. He asked
the Senate to let him know if they were interested and, if so, send him the
chart of the entire Republic borderland so that he could negotiate with Baron
Bartenstein.
A single reply to Bianchi’s three letters was dated 23 May 1737.109 The
certainty with which Bianchi reported on the occupation of Bosnia110 and the
news coming from the region itself—no military preparations were taking
place—led the Ragusan government to believe that the Turks would suffer a
defeat and the imperial army would advance to the Republic’s borders. The
Senate acted accordingly: Bianchi was instructed to keep a sharp eye on the
imperial army, for, prior the Bosnian offensive, Dubrovnik had to secure its
interests with the emperor. The payment of tribute (haraç) was the major is-
sue. In the preliminaries the emperor was expected to draw up certain condi-
tions by which Dubrovnik was to be exempt from paying tribute to the Turks.
Moreover, Vienna had to be informed that the Republic did not border di-
108 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 18.
109 Litt. Pon., vol. 54, ff. 248-257.
110 Provost –ivoviÊ was also to report about the ensuing conflict. DA XVIII, vol. 934 and 939,
no. 3.
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rectly with Bosnia but with Herzegovina, and if Austria had confined the
campaign only to Bosnia during the preliminaries, the Ragusans would have
found themselves in a far more difficult situation than before.
In terms of Bianchi’s suggestion to take advantage of the territorial acqui-
sition (qualche acquisto) the Ragusans showed an interest in regaining what
they once had and what had been taken from them by the Turks—and in ex-
panding their territory, if the circumstances allowed.
The letter, as Bianchi had requested, was accompanied by a geographic
chart, news from Turkey, description of roads through Herzegovina, plus the
coded names of all the officials taking part in the negotiations.111
The reply from Vienna was expected with the greatest anxiety, as it was
to decide whether the Senate would authorize Bianchi to present their cause
officially or not. In the Senate session of 27 May 1737, it was decided that
the Minor Council was to call the Senate into session immediately upon the
arrival of Bianchi’s letter.112 Bianchi was strictly instructed to keep the con-
tents of the letter to himself and proceed no further until he received new in-
structions.
The reply from Vienna soon arrived. On 8 June the Senate decided to in-
struct Bianchi to acquaint the said minister with the issue of tribute, but keep
the matter strictly confidential and use the letter for purposes none other than
the stated until further instructed.
The Senate brought this decision based on Bianchi’s letter of 18 May,113
in which he assured them that the outbreak of war was a matter of days, its
main goal being the occupation of Bosnia. He expected that General
Hilburghausen would march into Bosnia in mid-June, cross the Sava at
Gradiπka, and advance toward Banja Luka.
Bianchi received detailed instructions about his visit to Bartenstein.114 He
was to express the Republic’s joy and gratitude for the fulfillment of their
prayers to see the victorious army of His Catholic Highness liberate the
neighboring territories occupied by their barbarous mutual enemy. In addi-
111 Litt. Pon., vol. 54, f. 252.
112 Cons. Rog., vol. 158, f. 30v.
113 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 19.
114 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, ff. 6-8.
115 None of this was achieved, for very soon things went wrong for Austria.
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tion, he was instructed to ask Bartenstein to notify them of the exact date of
his meeting with the emperor.115
Meanwhile, Bianchi received the Senate’s letter of 23 May with news that
were well received (molto gradite) and the geographic chart he showed to
Baron Saidowitz, indicating the territories Venice had pretensions over and
the danger it could cause to both Austria and the Republic. He also empha-
sized the importance of the occupation of Herzegovina. On his way to the
congress in Nemirov as the first official negotiator, Marshal Wilcek submit-
ted the memorandum of the Bosnian borders to Bartenstein. Deeply convinced
that the war would soon be over,116 Bianchi’s patriotic self kept dreaming of
the acquisition of new territory (un nuovo acquisto). He elaborated on the
matter in cipher: the transaction contract should be made in the utmost se-
crecy; an accurate topographic chart should be drawn with exact measures
and descriptions (lowland, hill, forest, river, road, village, town, population);
revenues should be estimated and the price proposed; the emperor was to send
commissaries to investigate on the very spot. The commissaries were to be
warmly received and honored with gifts in hope of a favorable estimate.
Bianchi resumed the same subject in his next letter, dreaming of the Repub-
lic carving out new borders through “part or all of Herzegovina.”117 Here is
Bianchi’s plan: the Senate should prepare ready money, as Vienna seemed
to be deficient in, a fact that was likely to contribute to the success of the
transaction; the Ragusans should immediately start working on the contract
before the Germans realize what they were selling and before the Venetians
saw through the whole scheme. This should all take place prior the dismissal
of the congress so that the contract could be officially ratified. And most of
all, it must be carried out in the greatest secrecy to avoid other offers. Ci-
phered out, this letter also contains Bianchi’s report of his official interven-
tion regarding the tribute issue.
Bartenstein and Saidowitz118 witnessed the emperor’s promise to reward
the Ragusans for their ardent informing by introducing a separate clause in
116 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 22.
117 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 23, dated 13 July 1737.
118 Bianchi had acquainted Saidowitz with the matter, while the latter informed Bartenstein.
They both discussed it with the emperor.
119 The emperor put such confidence in the Ragusans that he decided to reveal the plan of the
forthcoming military operations to them.
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the peace treaty, according to which Dubrovnik would be exempt from pay-
ing tribute and be placed under Austrian protection.119 The part of the report
which was to the best of the Ragusans liking concerned the emperor’s hos-
tile attitude towards Venice. The emperor had no intention of having Venice
side with him, as their pretensions over Bosnia and Herzegovina coincided.
With Hilburghausen already on his way to Bosnia, Bianchi asked the Senate
for further instructions, so that he would be able to act accordingly.
The letter was acclaimed by the Senate on 30 July and it was decided to
reply120 on the same day.121 Promising to invest more energy into collecting
information, the bulk of the letter concerned the instructions that should be
forwarded to Hilburghausen. They insisted on the fair treatment of the Ragusan
merchants during the annexation of Bosnia, so that this shift would have a
minimum effect upon their state of affairs and free trade. As for the acquisi-
tion of new territory, about which Bianchi wrote so enthusiastically, the Sen-
ate aimed to bring him down to earth with all due respect for his deep patri-
otism, which led him to believe that the Republic had the means and desire
to expand. “Actions such as these, they wrote, may have grave implications
and cannot be undertaken with haste.” To be more precise, the right moment
had not yet come. Thus Bianchi was instructed to leave the matter be.122
In the days to follow the Senate received a couple of letters in which
Bianchi reported on the siege of Banja Luka, the seizure of Niπ, Seckendorf’s
advance toward Bosnia, where things did not go as planned, on Bosnia “fall-
ing into the imperial hands sooner or later.”123 But, prior to this, on 12 Au-
gust, Dubrovnik learned of the Austrian defeat near Banja Luka, which had
taken place on 4 August. The following day the Ragusans were informed of
Ali-pasha’s proclamation according to which the defeat of the Christian army
was to be celebrated throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.124
At first, the Ragusans were stunned by the news of the Austrian defeat.
120 Cons. Rog., vol. 158, f. 45v.
121 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, ff. 35-36.
122 The Ragusan government devoted considerable time to the sifting of Bianchi’s reports,
the evaluation of which always induced them to ask for more details, as in this letter. They wanted
to know whether Austria was also inclined to occupy the entire coast of Albania, or just a part of it.
123 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 24-26.
124 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 44.
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Yet they were the ones who had informed Vienna only a few days before of
Ali-pasha’s offensive towards Banja Luka and his multiplying troops con-
sisting of volunteers ready to defend their faith and homes.125 They were the
ones who, soon after the battle at Banja Luka, informed Bianchi of the Turks
being so furious that they did not care for their lives but for their faith and
hearth, fighting pro aris et focis.126 Although they had no special food pro-
visions, the Turkish forces proved resistant to all kinds of trials, helping them-
selves to what they considered common property at times such as these.127
This was the Turkish army as described by the Senate, an army practically
invincible. The likelihood of a Turkish victory was even greater due to the
prevailing discord in the Austrian headquarters, as accounted by Provost
wivoviÊ.128
Nevertheless, the Ragusans were still encouraged129 to believe that Aus-
tria would make one or two more moves before the season was over.130 They
did not allow this one defeat to interfere with their regular weekly reports to
Vienna,131 although Bianchi had informed them of the change in plans.132 A
whiff of hope could still be traced in the news from the capital. According to
Bianchi, the strategy to occupy Bosnia before the peace agreement was still
on the table.133 Moreover, their anticipation was such that on 21 September
1737 the Senate asked Bianchi to arrange the special delivery of the letters
125 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 42.
126 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 52v.
127 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 52v.
128 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 40 and 41.
129 In Dubrovnik the Turkish victory was not viewed as a major one, the way the Turks pre-
sented it. However, the Ragusan interpretation of the Ottoman defeat at Banja Luka was obviously
exaggerated. In the report of 18 August 1737 they speak of 12-15,000 Turks killed. Litt. Pon., vol.
55, f. 49.
130 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 66.
131 Ragusan reports were highly valued in Vienna and they served as reliable sources at con-
ferences. (DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 47) According to Bianchi, the reports on Bosnia were excel-
lently worded. (no. 30) From then on, they had to write two copies of the reports, one for the con-
ference, and the other for Bartenstein. (no. 47) Ragusan dispatches are among the richest sources
of information about the conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 87.
132 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 27.
133 Bianchi informed on the matter in his letter of 31 August 1737, as well as in those dated 7
September and 11 September. The last letter expresses his doubts about a positive outcome be-
cause of the disagreement between the generals, whom he refers to as greedy traders, innkeepers,
and butchers.
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to the commanders posted in Bosnia and Herzegovina.134
The events, however, proved different. The commander-in-chief, Marshal
Seckendorf, was imprisoned on 14 September. General Doxat surrendered Niπ
on 18 September.135 The Austrian army suffered a shameful defeat which, as
Bianchi put it, “shocked the entire world, a debacle hardly comparable with
any a battle in human history, and certainly never witnessed in the history of
the Habsburgs.”136
The Senate finally realized that betting on one horse for more than a year
was a fruitless and even a dangerous game. In their letter of 23 October they
informed Bianchi of the anxiety with which they looked upon the current
events and their development.137 Disconcerting news poured in: the defeated
and demoralized Austrian troops were retreating; marshals and generals were
being tried in Vienna; the Turks were boasting triumphantly, Ali-pasha, a hero,
was decorated by the Porte. Could all this be measured with their freedom,
and was it worth the risk? Far from it! Not for His Imperial and Catholic High-
ness nor the Pope of Rome himself. Consequently, they decided to send their
envoy and appease Ali-pasha with gifts of silk, sugar, and lemons. The cov-
ering letter read: “This here man we send you to pay our respects and share
the joy over the glorious deeds your most worthy wisdom has begotten and
your valor beyond compare.”138
This resolution was passed with only one dissenting vote on 14 Novem-
ber 1737. The man chosen for the mission was dragoman Miho Zarini (not a
nobleman as proposed by some). He was to present the Bosnian pasha with
6 rolls of silk, 30 sugar loaves, and two horses laden with lemons.139 On 26
November, Zarini received the following instructions: “The events having
taken place in Bosnia this year and the news we have lately received, urge
the Senate to send a person of particular confidence to the said pasha entrusted
with the tasks as follow...”140
134 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 74.
135 Executed in Belgrade on 28 March 1738.
136 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 35 and 36.
137 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 85.
138 Copiae litterarum diversarum, ser. 27.2 (hereafter cited as: Cop. litt.), vol. 2, f. 98 (SAD).
139 Cons. Rog., vol. 158, ff. 60v-61.
140 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, ff. 69-74v.
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Firstly, Zarini was instructed to congratulate the pasha on his masterly and
curageous handling of the situation and glorious victories, assure him that it
must have been providence trusting him with the wheel of Bosnia in the cir-
cumstances, and express most sincere congratulations on behalf of all
Ragusans, for there was nothing they treasured more than the well-being of
the Porte, and nothing would please them more than the happiness of His
Excellency, who had already helped them and would hopefully continue to
work for the benefit of the Republic.
The following set of instructions was more delicate. Zarini had to be pre-
pared for all kinds of expected and unexpected questions the pasha could pose,
such as why the Republic had kept silent for so long. The pasha’s objection
could be grounded on the fact that in the period between the arrival of Marko
Bassegli to greet the new pasha on 15 July 1736 and Zarini’s mission a year
later, no special contacts were made with Ali-pasha, nor were any reports
exchanged. The embarrassing interview could proceed with the question as
to why the Ragusan boat frequented Rijeka, why the Ragusans refused to sell
gunpowder to Trebinje, why they imprisoned a certain Jew, and lastly, how
they accounted for the incident involving merchants in Novi Pazar.
Although carefully instructed by the Senate, Zarini was faced with a dif-
ficult and responsible task. How was he to account for the Ragusan silence?
He was to assure the pasha that the Ragusans had always respected and ap-
preciated him, that they did, at first, provide the emins and mirimirans of
Trebinje with information on the Venetians, warning certain Turks about the
borders. The answers they received had been confusing, for the sultan was
on friendly terms with the Germans, whose emperor was an intermediary in
negotiating peace with Russia. Their assistance denied, the Ragusans decided
to stop informing, as their knowledge was based solely on what they saw and
heard from the Turks themselves.141 With the outbreak of hostilities, there
seemed to be no point in informing and disturbing His Excellency with the
things he was far better acquainted with than they were.142 Leaving the tim-
ing to Zarini, the Ragusans particularly instructed him to inform His Excel-
lency of the Senate’s disposition to congratulate him immediately upon the
victory at Banja Luka, but having taken into consideration the urgency of the
matter and the uncertainty of his whereabouts, they were forced to delay it to
141 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, f. 71v.
142 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, f. 71v.
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the day, while at heart the Ragusans never forgot their duties.143 As for the
frequent passage of ships to Rijeka, Zarini was instructed to say that mer-
chants often launched vessels to Venice, Ancona, and Rijeka for business
purposes. Trade not being his line, Zarini could say no more. In this “unfa-
miliar with—uninformed about” pattern Zarini was to answer all other ques-
tions.144
Zarini’s mission to Bosnia was to be kept highly confidential. By no means
was he to disclose his cover as a salt dealer travelling to Makarska. One of
the precautions was that he could not contact the pasha outside Sarajevo or
Travnik unless authorized by the Senate.
Zarini’s audience took place on 7 December 1737 and it turned out to be
a complete success. The Ragusan effort bore fruit. How contented and exult-
ant the Ragusans must have been reading Ali-pasha’s letter:
Respected among the Christian princes, honored among the
rulers of the Christian people, to the rector of Ragusa and other
beys (virtuous be their last hour), following the sincere greetings,
I inform you of the arrival of your sincere letter you have sent
me through Miho, your dragoman, the contents of which exhibit
your centuries-long loyalty, fidelity, and submission to the wor-
thy Ottoman Porte, and the affection and disposition you have
shown towards my person. The display of your devotion and
friendship joyed me so, in the name of which I have penned and
sent, through your dragoman Miho, this warm letter, upon the
delivery of which feel disposed to continue with this amiable
friendship, peace be upon them who follow the right path.145
Having received a response well beyond their expectations, the Ragusan
Senate decided to resume its old tactics.146 From then until the end of the
war, they kept sending regular reports both to Vienna and to Bosnia. The in-
formation they gathered on the Turks was sent to Vienna, while the news re-
ceived from Vienna and other centers was forwarded to Bosnia.147
143 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, f. 72.
144 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, f. 72.
145 Acta Turcarum, B 14/61 (SAD).
146 See Jorjo TadiÊ, ©panija i Dubrovnik u 16. veku. Posebna izdanja, 93. Beograd: SKA, 1932: p. 56.
147 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 56; Litt. Lev., vol. 74; Cop. litt., vol. 2, passim.
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The double role they played had its weaknesses, too. In early 1738, one
Viennese newspaper severely criticized the Ragusans for collaborating with
the Turks. This was occasioned by the transit of food from Morea to Bosnia
via Dubrovnik,148 as well as the crossing of the Albanian troops across the
Ragusan territory on their way to Bosnia.149 However, Ministers Weber and
Bartenstein showed a lot of consideration for the matter,150 and the Ragusans
themselves felt no remorse. They considered it no sin; moreover, each and
every ruler should sympathize with them. “After all, our relations with the
Turks can be easily understood by every ruler or even a man unaccomplished
in politics.”151
Another incident took place at the beginning of 1738, when Ali-pasha
prohibited the export of food from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dubrovnik in-
cluded. In order to obtain the special permit for the free export of at least
some basic foodstuffs, they sent Zarini on 29 March 1738.152 He was granted
the permit, provided that the imported food was not exported further. This,
however, prompted Venice to accuse Dubrovnik of hindering their hinterland
trade.153
The Austro-Turkish War left deep scars on the state of Ragusan commerce.
In order to improve its financial position, on 6 February 1738 the Ragusans
contacted King Charles, king of the Two Sicilies, requesting him to author-
ize an increase of interest on the capital owned by the Ragusan merchants in
his kingdom.154 On 4 March the Ragusans also wrote to Cardinal Barberini
on the same matter, asking him to issue a ten year-certificate according to
which half of the interest earned on their capital, intended for the Church,
148 The complete correspondence between the Dubrovnik authorities and Ali-pasha on the is-
sue of food transport has been preserved. Due to the lack of horses, food could not be transported
immediately and could thus spoil. Pasha finally ordered its sale. Acta Turcarum, B 14/35, 37, 40,
41, 43, 44; Cop. litt., vol. 2, ff. 105, 106, 130v.
149 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, ff. 143rv, 195; vol. 56, ff. 105-106.
150 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 49 of 12 April 1738.
151 Litt. Pon., vol. 56, f. 92. An almost identical phrase was used by the Ragusans back in
1530 in their letter to the city of Messina, when they were accused before Charles V of having
friendly relations with the Turks and recognizing their protectorate. See J. TadiÊ, ©panija i
Dubrovnik u 16. veku: p. 37.
152 Litt. Lev., vol. 74, f. 77.
153 Litt. Pon., vol. 56, f. 26.
154 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 121.
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could be used for public needs.155
The Ragusans had some additional problems during the upheavals in
Montenegro in mid-1738, but there were no serious consequences. They did
not fail to inform Vienna of these events on 10 May.156 The grouping of
Montenegrins forced Ali-pasha to keep his men posted along the border of
Montenegro. He informed the Ragusans about it and warned them to be on
the alert.157 The measures taken by the Senate consisted in sending a noble-
man, Mato Natali, to Mrcine, on the Ragusan border with Montenegro, with
the task to organize the Republic’s defense.158
The Ragusans continued their simultaneous activity of informing Vienna
and the Ottoman Turks, although the odds seemed to be against the Austri-
ans. Tormented with the plague in Hungary and Transylvania159 and com-
manded by incompetent generals,160 the Austrian Army was far from victory.
155 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 136v.
156 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 177v.
157 Cop. litt., vol. 2, f. 144.
158 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 184.
159 DA XVIII, vol. 934 and 939, no. 61, 67, 68, 70.
160 Rumors in Vienna had it that the emperor passed a scornful remark to Marshal Palfi: “Dis-
pleased indeed we are with you, as well as with other generals who understand nothing.” (DA XVIII,
vol. 958/2, no. 84). Ministers and generals were held up as objects of ridicule in Vienna. Bianchi
quotes them in letter no. 42:
Starenberg: L’on dit que je suis bien politique et flateur on dira ce qu’on voudra, je aime l’argent
contant.
Zinzendorf: Je pense et mange bien et l’on ne m’écoute en rien.
Harrah: Je me mèle de tout, je contredis en rien mon unique but est d’amaser du bien.
Königseg: Je pense et représente ce qui est nécessaire et je ne fais, que ce qu’on me fait faire.
Bartenstein: Pour avoir cru à deux fanfarons je passe dans le monde pour un gran cuion.
Palfi: La longue expérience ne sert de rien quand on n’a point les grâces de Bartenstein.
Sackendorf: Je ne prend pour mon maître que ce qu’on me donne et préfère mon profit à celui de
la couronne.
Filippi: Je consent à tout, m’oppose à rien. Je suis maréchal sans argent et sans bien.
Kewenüller: Je suis fourbe et intrigant de profession pour parvenir à mon but, je fais tout confusion.
Hilburghausen: Je puis dire en conscience que rien ne me manque, qu’une longue expérience.
Wallis: J’ai de l’expérience, de l’argent et de la santé et on fait autant de cas de moi, que d’un âne bâté.
Weber: Je suis petit, je glisse partout je file de l’or, et ma femme de bijoux.
According to hearsay, a certain marshal, when asked about his opinion on Hilburghausen, replied:
“Prince Hilburghausen has fire in his heart and straw in his head” (DA XVIII, vol. 934 and 939, no. 46).
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That is why the Senate’s major concern was to keep its intelligence activities
as secret as possible. For example, Bianchi required instructions as to how to
recommend the Republic to Minister Weber, who was inclined to help the
Ragusans and who played an important role in the peace negotiations.161 In
a letter dated 10 April 1738, the Senate wrote:
It pleases us to witness how ambitiously thoughtful you are
at all times when the interests of the state are in question. How-
ever, we find it necessary to warn you of the secrecy under which
you are to recommend the Republic to him [Weber], just as viv-
idly as you did earlier to Bartenstein—partly in order to avoid
the tempest that could buffet us, you, or anyone else in the event
that it got into the open that such information was sent from here,
and partly in order for us to be able to continue sending it.162
Concerning the recommendation, Bianchi was to speak to Weber on the
general issues, for the Senate felt that no benefit and only harm would be
done to their relations with the Turks if the emperor launched any of their
issues under the circumstances.163
Bianchi was perfectly aware of the Republic’s position, which he com-
mented on metaphorically in his next letter: “I am aware that the emperor’s
protection at this moment means to Your Excellencies the same as the early
spring sunshine to the human body, mellowing the juices but not able to con-
trol them, moreover, serious consequences could lie ahead.”164
In the end, the large-scale Austrian preparations for an offensive in 1739
proved fruitless as anticipated.165 The heavy blow the Austrian troops suf-
fered at Grocka on 22 July 1739 enabled the Turks to advance further to
Belgrade.166
In the meantime, Austrian diplomats were busy with peace negotiations.
Duke Gross paid several visits to the camp of the grand vizier, but with little
161 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 156.
162 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 46 of 8 March 1738.
163 Litt. Pon., vol. 55, f. 156v.
164 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 52 of 4 May 1738.
165 “Weapons are useless without the brains,” wrote Bianchi in code. DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 84.
166 Bianchi comments on this defeat as divine condemnation. DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 123.
Letter no. 122 contains the description of the battle at Grocka as seen by an eyewitness.
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success, as the Turks demanded the surrender of Belgrade to be included in
the preliminary. In the final stage of the peace talks Gross was accompanied
by Minister Neipperg.167
On 1 September 1739, Austria finally came to terms with the Turks in a
treaty most unfavorable for Vienna. The treaty entrusted the whole territory
of Serbia to the Turks, including Belgrade and all the territory lost by the
Treaty of Passarowitz except for the city of Furjan, at the Croatian border.
The fortifications of Belgrade had to be torn down at Austria’s expense.168
The messenger carrying these news, General d’Argentau Meray, arrived in
Vienna on 7 September. At first, it was generally considered that only an
outline of the peace treaty was in question. Thus on 9 September Bianchi wrote
that the Austrians generally felt that the terms would not be accepted and hos-
tilities would be resumed unless a peace agreement based on the uti possi-
detis principle was reached.
However, a further factor in inducing the emperor to conclude peace with
the Turks was the military failure of General Wallis, who had already opened
the way for the Ottomans to march into Belgrade.169
The Ragusans received news of the treaty only a few days after it had been
signed, their source being none other than Ali-pasha himself:
Well-disposed I here inform you of the German Army and
their intention to fight battle with our victorious and celebrated
army at Kisrdæik, where, with the help of Lord the Savior, the
Turkish people were the victors, with the German troops over-
powered and pursued to Belgrade. Unable to resist, they marched
towards the Danube, while the imperial army besieged Belgrade,
and after forty difficult days the Germans begged for peace
through the French envoy under the condition of surrendering
Belgrade and ©abac and all the lands they have come to possess
in Karawalachia and in Bosnia as far as the Una river, in the same
way as in the Karlowitz Treaty. In the name of the said condi-
167 DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 126 and 127.
168 The Turks, namely, offered several million for Belgrade and its fortifications, Austria set-
tling for ten million. The transaction was pure hearsay. Belgrade was devastated in less than 10
months. DA XVIII, vol. 958/2, no. 135.
169 According to the historian Mayer, that was the worst moment the emperor experienced in
his entire reign (Geschichte des Österreichs II: p. 75).
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tions on 1 September peace was signed and confirmed by both
sides. This here affair motivated me to write you this friendly
note, so that you, too, know the way it was done and con-
tracted...170
The letter was delivered to the Ragusans by one of Ali-pasha’s aghas ac-
companied by an attendant. The agha received a reward of 30 Venetian se-
quins171 and a cloth valued to 11 ducats and 16 groschen, while the attend-
ant received 2 sequins. The two were to carry the following sweet-talking
reply dated 12 September 1739: “The overwhelming joy with which we have
received the commendable letter of your serene and honorable lordship, car-
rying happy and good news about the mighty Empire having invaded Bel-
grade and accorded peace to the German emperor who had pleaded for it, we
cannot describe, but your most profound wisdom, which knows our heart, will
easily sense it. The victory and glory of the worthy Porte should be celebrated
by all those fortunate to breathe in the shadow of its prosperity; as we seek
our being and shelter in the mercy of the glorious Empire. We thank you in
this particular way for the promptness with which you have informed us, the
very manner exhibiting your affection for us. It joys us to see your victories,
famed for wisdom and courage, celebrated far and wide...”172
The Ragusans did not miss the occasion to congratulate Ali-pasha again
and present him with extra gifts through the tribute envoys, who, on 21 Oc-
tober, were intentionally instructed to pass through Bosnia on their way to
Constantinople.173
This could be considered the closing page of the diplomatic activity of the
Dubrovnik Republic in the Austro-Turkish War.
III
In this war Ragusan diplomacy acted within the framework it had created
for these and similar situations. Whenever imperiled by Venice, the Repub-
170 Acta Turcarum, B 14/50 (translated from Turkish).
171 Cons. Rog., vol. 159, f. 50v.
172 Cop. litt., vol. 2, f. 152.
173 He was to be presented with a roll of silk and a box of scents. Litt. Lev., vol. 74, f. 135v.
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lic of Dubrovnik sought to secure its interests with Venetia’s enemies, the
Turks, the Spaniards, or the French. In this case Austria’s interests directly
collided with those of Venice. Guided by reason, the Republic decided to align
with Austria against Venice. Like the rest of Europe, Dubrovnik wrongly
estimated the outcome of the military campaign. Hoping for an Ottoman with-
drawal, the Republic took all the measures in order to prevent Venice from
perching on its borders and cutting it off from the vital inland routes. Ragusan
diplomatic activity focused on the catholic Austria, which was to guarantee
the freedom of its trade and stimulate its maritime commerce by chartering
Ragusan ships. Having learned much from experience, Dubrovnik sensed that
this episode required cool heads and the utmost caution. They had no inten-
tion of repeating the unpleasant experience after Kara Mustafa’s defeat at
Vienna when their diplomatic relations with the Turks were officially bro-
ken off and they sided with Austria. Doctor Bianchi, their correspondent in
Vienna, maintained his unofficial status throughout the war. There were sug-
gestions, however, to post an official representative there, but the Senate re-
fused to consider such an idea. The Republic showed impressive
foresightedness when the purchase of new territory was concerned, had the
Austrians won.
Their estimate proven wrong, the Republic did not hesitate to coordinate
its diplomatic activity with its interests. Still balancing between Turkey and
Austria, once again Dubrovnik proved more inclined toward Turkey.
As for the Republic’s intelligence activity in this war, its role could be
viewed as two-fold: on one hand, its task was to cover accurately the politi-
cal situation and war operations related to its national security and foreign
policy, and on the other, it placed itself in the service of the warring parties
in an attempt to indebt and humor them. Pursuing the same goal for centu-
ries, there is no doubt about the contribution of the Ragusan intelligence to
the development and efficiency of its diplomacy.
